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Abstract This discussion follows a series of high pro-
file cases involving a terminally ill child, Charlie Gard.
These cases are significant as they trace the complexities
that arise when parents and medical teams do not agree
as well as addressing the question of whether there is a
right to access experimental treatment.
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Introduction
This discussion follows a series of high profile cases
involving a terminally ill child, Charlie Gard. These
cases are significant as they trace the complexities that
arise when parents and medical teams do not agree as
well as addressing the question of whether there is a right
to access experimental treatment. At its heart, it is a story
of human suffering, hope (and despair), and how a court
can manage situations of unreconcilable differences of
opinion regarding what is in the best interests of a child.
Timeline
The legal case involving Charlie Gard, Great Ormond
Street Hospital (GOSH), and Charlie’s parents Con-
stance Yates and Chris Gard, was heard at all levels of
the U.K. courts before progressing to the European
Court of Human Rights and finally returning to the
Family Division of the High Court. It was a lengthy
process and before considering the key legal issues it is
worth noting the timeline as it is complex, involves all
levels of domestic courts, the European Court of Human
Rights, the Pope, and the President of the United
States—running in parallel with active social and main-
stream media campaigns:
& 24 February: Application by GOSH to Family
Division of High Court
& 3 March 2017: Mr Justice Francis starts to ana-
lyse the case at a hearing in the Family Division
of the High Court in London
& 11 April: Mr Justice Francis grants declarations
which allows doctors to stop providing life-
support treatment as treatment is no longer in
Charlie’s best interests
& 3 May: Charlie’s parents ask Court of Appeal
judges to consider the case
& 23 May: Court of Appeal analyse and dismiss
the case
& 8 June: Supreme Court dismisses the appeal
& 19 June: Supreme Court grant a further stay to
the declarations for three weeks
& 20 June: Judges in the European Court of
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Human Rights consider written submission
from lawyers representing Charlie’s parents
& 27 June: Judges in the European Court of Hu-
man Rights refuse to intervene
& 3 July: The Pope and U.S. President Donald
Trump offer to intervene
& 7 July: GOSH applies to the High Court for an
affirmation of the April declarations
& 24 July: Charlie’s parents end their legal fight
to take him to the U.S. for treatment
& 26 July: Deadline set for Charlie’s parents and
GOSH to agree how and when he will die
& 27 July: The 12pm deadline for Charlie’s par-
ents and GOSH to agree how and when he will
die passes
& 28 July: Charlie’s death is announced
Factual Background
Charlie was born apparently healthy and at full term on
August 4th, 2016. Over time it was observed that he was
less able to lift his head or support himself than expected
and was failing to gain weight. He was admitted to
GOSH on October 11th, 2016 and subsequently diag-
nosed with a fatal and rare inherited mitochondrial dis-
ease called infantile onset encephalomyopathic mito-
chondrial DNA depletion syndrome, referred to general-
ly as MDDS, caused by a mutation in the RRM2B gene.
Charlie’s parents accepted that his quality of life was
poor and not worth sustaining but disagreed with the
assessment of the team at GOSH that further treatment
was futile and that palliative care should be pursued.
Instead, they wished to take Charlie to the United States
for experimental nucleoside therapy treatment. This
therapy was in early stages of development and had
yet to be tested on mice, let alone patients with the same
strain of MDDS as Charlie.
The First Hearing: Great Ormond Street Hospital v
Yates and others [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam)
The medical experts at GOSH were firm in their rejec-
tion of the proposed therapy, arguing that it was not in
Charlie’s interests and sought court intervention. On
February 24th, 2017 GOSH made an application to the
Family Division of the High Court seeking the follow-
ing declarations:
1) That Charlie, by reason of his minority, lacks
capacity to make decisions regarding his medical
treatment;
2) That it is lawful and in Charlie’s best in-
terests, for artificial ventilation to be with-
drawn;
3) That it is lawful, and in Charlie’s best
interests, for his treating clinicians to pro-
vide him with palliative care only; and
4) That it is lawful, and in Charlie’s best
interests, not to undergo nucleoside thera-
py provided always that the measures and
treatments adopted are the most compati-
ble with maintaining Charlie’s dignity.
The Law
Charlie clearly lacked capacity to consent or refuse
medical treatment by reason of his age and his condi-
tion. In such circumstances it is usually the parents who
make medical decisions, however, where there is intrac-
table dispute between parents and medical professionals
the final arbiter is the court; the overriding control is
vested in the court exercising its independent and objec-
tive judgment in the child’s best interests. In making his
decision in this instance, Francis J was guided by the
Bintellectual milestones^ set by the Court of Appeal in
Wyatt v Portsmouth NHS Trust [2000] 1 FLR 554. The
Court of Appeal in Wyatt said:
In our judgment, the intellectual milestones for the
judge in a case such as the present are, therefore,
simple, although the ultimate decision will fre-
quently be extremely difficult. The judge must
decide what is in the child’s best interests. In
making that decision, the welfare of the child is
paramount, and the judge must look at the ques-
tion from the assumed point of view of the child.
There is a strong presumption in favour of a
course of action which will prolong life, but that
presumption is not irrebuttable. The term Bbest
interests^ encompasses medical, emotional, and
all other welfare issues. ([38])
462 Bioethical Inquiry (2017) 14:461–468
Medical Evidence from GOSH
Medical experts from GOSH explained that due to
MDDS Charlie had suffered dysfunction of several organ
systems; his brain, muscles, and ability to breathe were all
severely affected. In addition, he had congenital deafness
and a severe epilepsy disorder. His heart, liver, and kid-
neys were also affected although not severely. Charlie
had severe progressive muscle weakness and could not
move his arms or legs or breathe unaided. He was per-
sistently encephalopathic so, whilst not brain dead, there
were no usual signs of normal brain activities such as
responsiveness, crying, or interaction and he suffered
from seizures. The medical experts were in agreement
that there was no chance of recovery and that Charlie did
not derive any benefit from continued life. As noted by
Francis J, Charlie was in a parlous state and MDDS is a
progressive and life-limiting condition. There was no
evidence of Charlie responding to his parents, it was
impossible to tell if Charlie was awake or asleep, or to
know if he was suffering pain, pleasure, or comfort.
The Proposed Treatment: Nucleoside Therapy
Charlie’s parents did what many would do, they searched
for a treatment that would prolong life or even slightly
improve Charlie’s condition. They discovered nucleoside
therapy, which had been used on patients with a different
and less severe mitochondrial condition known as TK2
mutation. There was some evidence that patients with the
TK2 mutation had benefited from nucleoside therapy.
The parents were in contact with Dr I, a professor of
Neurology at a medical center in the United States,
regarding possible treatment of Charlie. Initial discus-
sions confirmed that there was a Btheoretical
possibility^ of the nucleoside therapy being of some
benefit to Charlie but Dr I made it clear that a baseline
MRI scan was necessary as severe brain involvement
was a contraindication to the therapy being trialled
(Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates and others
[2017] EWHC 972 (Fam)[77]). In January 2017, fol-
lowing a further MRI that appeared to show no struc-
tural damage, GOSH drafted an Ethics Committee ap-
plication so that nucleoside therapy could be considered
in England. Charlie was also placed on a list for a
tracheostomy to be performed on January 16th, 2017.
It was at this time that disagreement between GOSH
and the parents emerged. Charlie suffered an episode of
seizure activity that started on January 9th or 10th and
continued intermittently until January 27th. The Ethics
Committee meeting set for January 13th was postponed
due to the increased seizure frequency and likely severe
epileptic encephalopathy. On January 13th, Charlie’s
consultant neurologist, Dr K, and his ICU consultant
met with his parents to inform them that Charlie was
suffering with severe epileptic encephalopathy and that
all teams were in agreement that the nucleoside therapy
would be futile and only serve to prolong Charlie’s
suffering. It was clear to the medical team that it was
no longer in Charlie’s best interests to be subjected to
nucleoside therapy, but Charlie’s parents did not agree.
It is worth noting here that GOSH has asserted that
funding was not an issue and if nucleoside therapy had
been of benefit to Charlie then it would have pursued
that treatment. This is contrary to the view that many
others formed in the context of the parents’ passionate
and successful plea to the public to provide funding for
treatment in the United States, with over £1.3million
raised via a gofundme page (GoFundMe 2017).
Crucially, it was presented to the court that even if
nucleoside therapy was able to cross the blood/brain
barrier (which was essential in this situation), it was
not possible to reverse the process for neurones already
lost. It was predicted that death was at most six to nine
months away. One medical expert, Professor A, asserted
that there was a difference in philosophy of treatment in
the United States and in the United Kingdom. She
suggested that in the United States any medical treat-
ment will be attempted so long as funding is available,
whilst her approach was one that centred on the best
interests of the patient (Great Ormond Street Hospital v
Yates and others [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam) [90]). The
U.S. medical expert Dr I made it clear that, despite the
lack of scientific evidence of potential improvement in
Charlie’s specific circumstances, he would treat him
([99] and [106]). Of significance to the court, Dr I
described the probability of benefit to Charlie’s brain
as low but not zero and agreed that there could be no
reversal of the damage to Charlie’s brain.
Position of The Parents
The parents did not accept that Charlie was as bad as
reported by the medics, and did not want the declara-
tions to be granted. They wanted to give Charlie a
chance to improve.
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Position of Charlie Through His Guardian
Charlie’s Guardian, Ms Butler-Cole, concluded that Bit
is not in Charlie’s best interests to travel to America to
receive nucleoside therapy. This is not pioneering or
life-saving treatment, but purely a experimental process
with no real prospect of improving Charlie’s condition
or quality of life^ (Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates
and others [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam) [117]). The pre-
sented evidence prompted Francis J Bto ask the question
as to whether it would be worth giving it a try on the
basis that, without experimentation, medicine cannot
advance^ ([119]). Significantly however, as noted by
the judge, the legal test that he had to apply B… is what
is in Charlie’s best interests not what is in the best
interests of medical experimentation^ ([121]) thus ren-
dering his question obsolete.
Decision
Francis J granted the declarations sought by GOSH; it
was not in Charlie’s best interests to have nucleoside
therapy and therefore it was lawful to withdraw artificial
ventilation and provide palliative care only.
The withdrawal of treatment was delayed until the
parents had made a decision regarding the appeals
process.
The First Appeal, Challenging Best Interests: Yates
and Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital [2017]
EWCA Civ 410
Charlie’s parents appealed seeking a positive declaration
that they could arrange for Charlie to be transferred to a
clinic in the United States to receive nucleoside therapy.
They were represented by a new legal team which
presented five grounds of appeal, three of which the
Court of Appeal felt were sufficient to hear but all were
ultimately unsuccessful.1
Grounds 1 and 2 before the court centred on proce-
dural issues and focussed on the jurisdiction of the court
and assertions that, as a matter of law, a different ap-
proach should be taken to cases where a choice is to be
made between two viable treatment options. Ground 4
of the Appeal was the claim that no, or insufficient,
regard was had to the rights of Charlie and his parents
under Articles 2, 5, and 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights; this last ground was granted permis-
sion to appeal on the basis that the arguments supported
the other two grounds for appeal.
The permitted grounds of appeal raised new legal
argument as well as a new point of law. First, it was
claimed that BThe judge had erred in making an order
that prevented C from receiving medical treatment by
expert physicians in a reputable hospital overseas in
circumstances where there was no risk of that treatment
causing significant harm to C^ (Ground 1). Secondly, that
The judge had no jurisdiction to grant an order on
the application of one clinical team preventing a
second clinical team from carrying out a treatment
that the latter had offered in the reasonable exer-
cise of its professional judgment… The declara-
tion made by the judge has de facto injunctive
effect in that it prevents C’s parents from remov-
ing from GOSH to undergo treatment in the USA.
(Ground 2) (Yates and Gard v Great Ormond
Street Hospital [2017] EWCA Civ 410[54]).
It was argued that there should be two categories of
cases in instances of dispute about medical treatment of
a child; Category 1 involved situations where no alter-
native therapeutic option was presented and should be
dealt with under the best interests test, and Category 2
where a viable alternative was put forward by the par-
ents, in which the court should be required to choose
between the proposed treatments. It was argued that
parental choice should only be overridden if the pro-
posed option was likely to cause the child to suffer
significant harm, even if the proposed course of treat-
ment is not in the child’s best interests ([110]). Re King
[2014] EWHC 2964 (Fam) was presented as the only
authority for this distinction.
The Court of Appeal rejected this distinction and
upheld the primacy of the best interests of the child test.
The Court concluded that Re King provided no basis for
any test based on significant harm to be applied to cases
relating to themedical treatment of children and that Bthe
1
The two grounds which were refused permission to appeal are
Ground 3, the assertion that the judge fell into error in conducting the
Bbest interests^ evaluation, and Ground 5, that the parents and the legal
team were placed at an unfair disadvantage as a result of late disclosure
of documents. These were unarguable (Yates and Gard v Great
Ormond Street Hospital [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [36]).
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sole principle is that the best interests of the child must
prevail and that must apply even to cases where parents,
for the best of motives, hold onto some alternative view^
([112]). As noted by MacFarlane LJ, the argument was
also undermined by the fact that BThere is no viable,
alternative treatment for poor C,^ and that if invited to do
so, the judge would have formed a conclusion that
Charlie was currently suffering significant harm and
Bthat to move C to America and expose him to treatment
over there would be likely to expose him to continued
pain, suffering and distress^ ([113] and [114]).
With regards to Ground 2 it was noted that GOSH
made the application to the court in the conventional
terms. The issue of alternative therapy was one that was
raised by the parents as the proceedings progressed, at
which point the choice had to be made by the judge
rather than the hospital ([116]).
The Second Appeal—A Further Challenge to Best
Interests Test: In the Matter of Charlie Gard,
Supreme Court, June 8th 2017
Therewas a further attempt to challenge the conclusions on
the basis that the best interests test was not correct and that
the hospital could only interfere in the decision taken by
the parents if the child is likely to suffer significant harm. It
was also argued that decisions taken by parents who agree
with one another are non-justiciable as parents alone are
the judges of their child’s best interests; any other approach
would be an unjustifiable interference with their status as
parents and their rights under article 8 European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. These arguments were rejected and
the primacy of the best interests test re-asserted.
On the Way to The European Court: Judgment
of the U.K. Supreme Court in the Case of Charlie
Gard, June 19th, 2017
The Supreme Court was involved in the legal proceed-
ings once more due to the further appeal, this time to the
European Court of Human Rights. The U.K. Govern-
ment asked the Supreme Court to give directions that it
considered appropriate with regard to the interim order
under Rule 39 of the European Court of Human Rights.
The interim order required the provision of artificial
ventilation nutrition and hydration (AVNH) to Charlie
until the European Court had determined the application
(Judgment of the U.K. Supreme Court in the Case of
Charlie Gard, June 19th, 2017 [5]).
The Supreme Court noted the difficulty that this
further stay of declarations placed upon the court, the
hospital, and overarchingly upon Charlie himself ([7]).
Reference was made to the numerous successive stays
granted since April 11th, all of which, evidence sug-
gested, were not in the best interests of Charlie. As noted
by the Supreme Court,
The hospital finds itself in an acutely difficult
ethical dilemma: although the stays have made it
lawful to continue to provide him with AVNH, it
considers it professionally wrong for it to have
continued for over two months to act otherwise
than in his best interests (Judgment of the U.K.
Supreme Court in the Case of Charlie Gard,
June 19th, 2017 [15]).
These concerns were echoed by Charlie’s guardian
who submitted that it was time for the court to decline
any further stays. But given the history of previous stays
and the appeal to the European Court of Human Rights,
with hesitation, the SupremeCourt granted a further stay
of three weeks but urged the European Court to address
the application within this time frame ([20]).
And Finally: Gard and Others v U.K. ECHR app no
39793/17
The European Court heard (and rejected) arguments on
behalf of Charlie and his parents. Charlie’s parents
argued that, in blocking access to life-sustaining treat-
ment, GOSH had deprived Charlie of his liberty in
contravention of Articles 2 and 5 European Convention
on Human Rights. Charlie’s parents further complained
that under Article 6 the Court of Appeal conclusion that
their intended parental decisions would cause Charlie
Bsignificant harm^ was made without hearing witness
evidence. And finally, they claimed under Article 8 to
have suffered disproportionate interference in their pa-
rental rights because the High Court decision that had
been taken on the basis of the best interests of a child,
failed to ask whether there was a likelihood that the
child Bis suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm^
(Gard and Others v U.K. ECHR app no 39793/17 [55]
and ([56]).
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The foundational principle was once again seen to be
the best interests of the child with the European Court of
Human Rights concluding that the decisive issue was
… whether the fair balance that must exist be-
tween the competing interests at stake—those of
the child, of the two parents, and of public
order—has been struck, within the margin of ap-
preciation afforded to States in such matters, tak-
ing into account, however, that the best interests of
the child must be of primary consideration. (Gard
and Others v U.K. ECHR app no 39793/17 [107])
The European Court of Human Rights recognized that
the domestic framework has a wide margin of apprecia-
tion in cases that raise sensitive moral and ethical issues.
Equally, there was a U.K. legal framework that was
Convention compliant and governed access to experimen-
tal medication as well as withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. The domestic court decisions had been metic-
ulous, thorough, and reviewed at three levels of jurisdic-
tion. The European Court gave significant weight to the
fact that the U.K. court had had direct contact with all
involved as well as access to significant technical exper-
tise and concluded that it was not the role of the European
Court to substitute itself for domestic courts.
Trial by Judiciary or Trial by Public Opinion?
This series of decisions is a clear application and endorse-
ment of well established legal principles to determine if
medical treatment is in a child’s best interests, at each level
the court took into account medical advice, parental
wishes, the child’s current and future position, and the
possibility of experimental medical treatment. In that re-
gard, the decisions are legally unremarkable. What makes
them noteworthy (and potentially concerning) is the paral-
lel process of Btrial by public opinion^ fed by social-media
campaigns and outside commentaries that culminated in
the extraordinary intervention by both the President of the
United States and the Pope. The courts on the one hand
were carefully considering the medical evidence and the
harsh realities of Charlie’s situation and weighing this
against the hopes of parents confronted with the tragedy
of a dying child. The public (and the Pope and the Presi-
dent) did not, however, have the luxury of meticulous
evidence, they focused instead on the Brights of the
parents^ and challenged the role of the medical profession
and judicial system in decision-making in this context. The
great tragedy of a terminally ill child translated into a
dialogue about parental rights and this was fuelled by the
fundraising efforts of Charlie’s parents which was bol-
stered by media coverage (GoFundMe 2017).
Media reports described nucleoside therapy as
Binnovative,^ Bradical,^ and Bpioneering^ (Smith-
Squire and Roberts 2017; Al-Othman 2017; Telegraph
Reporters 2017). These value-laden terms pointed to
hope and cure but Charlie’s interests would have been
better served with the more accurate description of
Bexperimental.^2 The extensive testing, research ethics,
and protocols that are in place for new treatments,
medicines, and devices have been designed to ensure
that treatments are safe and effective when they reach
patients. Accusations of the law preventing innovative
medical treatment are not justified (Richards 2016), and
terming experimental treatments as Binnovative^ sug-
gests that it is new but tried and tested; nucleoside
therapy had not even been tested on mice. Charlie’s case
has been aired extensively in the media across the world
over the last fewmonths; the media spin put on Charlie’s
case did not help his medical situation, and it has been
argued by at least one commentator that the inaccurate
reporting in the United States on the situation
Breinforced the parental refusal to accept this tragic
situation^ (Phillips 2017).
In contrast to the media reports that supported the
parent’s wishes to take Charlie abroad for experimental
treatment, GOSH and Charlie’s treating doctors, along-
side the legal system were presented as blocking life-
saving treatment, removing the right of parents to make
decisions regarding their children, and of not having
Charlie’s interests as their paramount concern (Smith-
Squire 2017). However, as explained, the courts consis-
tently referred back to Charlie’s best interests and it was
his parents and their supporters who argued that this was
not the correct test to apply.
This series of cases raised many questions, and it be-
came apparent that two potential imperatives drive access
to treatment, the first being the best interests and the other,
the Bexperimental^/Bfinancial.^ The willingness of the
2
It is recognized that many media sources did refer to the proposed
treatment as experimental although few referred to the fact that this
treatment had not even been tested on mice. For example, the Daily
Mail provided an extensive review of the court proceedings, but
omitted the lack of research that the proposed treatment had gone
through (Moore and Greenhill 2017).
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U.S. doctor to provide this experimental therapy raises
ethical questions of providing a treatment purely based
on the availability of funding. At some point Charlie’s
parents were allowed to believe that if they could simply
raise the money to travel to the United States then their son
would have hope, whereas the willingness to provide an
untested therapy on the sole basis of raising the required
money should have raised warning flags and prompted
further questions around anticipated outcomes. There was
an implication that GOSH was refusing treatment based
upon financial constraints. This was in direct contrast to
assertions by GOSH that funding of treatment was never
an issue, had taken steps towards seeking ethics committee
approval in order to provide nucleoside therapy, and that
all medical experts involved agreed that the therapy was
futile.
Unfortunately, the legal saga did not end with the
European Court of Human Rights decision; in early July
the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the
Pope intervened by offering treatment to Charlie. On
July 7th, GOSH returned to the High Court for affirma-
tion of the declarations made on April 11th and requested
that orders were made due to the interpretation by the
White House that declarations would permit transfer of
Charlie to another hospital (GOSH v Yates and others
[2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam) [2]). It was asserted by the
parent’s solicitors that new evidence meant that there was
a duty upon GOSH to refer the matter back to court. This
new evidence included that there was a hospital in Rome
willing to accept the transfer of Charlie, as was the U.S.
centre, and on the basis that Dr Hirano (previously re-
ferred to as Dr I) had new laboratory findings that indi-
cated a higher possibility of benefit to Charlie as well as
likelihood that the therapy would cross the blood brain
barrier ([8]). Dr Hirano visited Charlie in hospital on
July 18th. Charlie’s parents gave up the legal fight on
July 24th after Dr Hirano examined a more recent MRI
scan and concluded that Charlie had no chance of success
from the nucleoside therapy. And then the tide of public
opinion turned, and Dr Hirano has since been strongly
criticized by the press, social media, and notably by
GOSH (GOSH 2017). It is not possible to know if
agreement between the parents and GOSH would have
been reached sooner if Dr Hirano had visited earlier, but
his failure to engage fully with all available medical
evidence before advising both the parents and the court
was inexcusable (Jayaram 2017).
The legal proceedings and media circus did not,
however, end when Charlie’s parents withdrew their
opposition. There was a failure to come to an agreement
about the timing and place in which Charlie’s withdraw-
al of treatment would occur. Charlie’s parents wanted to
take him home for his last few days, but due to the
invasive ventilation that Charlie was being treated with,
GOSH was not in a position to enable this, not least
because it was said that the equipment would not fit
through the front door of their house. The court was
again called on to intervene and Francis J was forced to
give a deadline of 12pm on Thursday July 27th in order
for GOSH and Charlie’s parents to come to an agree-
ment, otherwise Charlie would be transferred to a hos-
pice. The deadline passed without agreement. Charlie
was transferred to a hospice, and his parents announced
his death on July 28th.
This series of cases serve as a strong cautionary tale,
sometimes those closest to a sick person are not in the
best position to make decisions, tragedy and grief, com-
bined with offers of hope can cloud judgement. It was
clear, and this was emphasized by Francis J, Charlie’s
parents were clearly dedicated to him, they were living
every parent’s nightmare and were driven by a desperate
hope but potentially failed to see what would be in his
best interests. In complex situations such as this, it is
vital that the Court acts as an arbiter to ensure that the
child’s best interests are applied as the paramount con-
cern. As demonstrated throughout the Gard cases, the
courts will, at all times, pay respect to the treating team
and the parents but above all, the patient at the centre of
the dispute (here, it was Charlie) comes first. Sadly, this
cannot be said of the poorly informed international
public narrative that surrounded the cases, which is
why we must look to the legal system and not social
media to answer the difficult question of what is in a
child’s best interest.
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